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Generations, Waves, and Epochs
MODES OF WARFARE AND THE RPMA*
DR ROBERT J. BUNKER

T

HE PUBLICATION of the article written by Col
Owen E. Jensen, USAF, entitled “Information
Warfare: Principles of Third-Wave War” in the
Winter 1994 issue of Airpower Journal represents a
significant event. Tofflerian concepts, which have
gained so much credence with the Army, are now beginning to openly influence Air Force dialogue on information-based future war. In that article, Colonel
Jensen states that “the Tofflers provide probably the
clearest and most accurate explanation of how this new
type of warfare evolved.” 1
Before the Air Force openly embraces the
Tofflerian trinity of agrarian, industrial, and informa
tional war forms, some well-informed reflection should
first take place. This reflection requires an understand
ing of the three dominant theories of future war cur
rently debated in the military journals— fourth-gen
eration warfare, third-wave war, and fourth-epoch war. 2

Specifically, these modes of warfare and perspectives
on the revolution in political and military affairs
(RPMA) need to be analyzed because these assump
tions provide the foundations behind each theory’s pro
jections of future warfare. 3 Instances where the meth
odology behind such assumptions falls short should thus
be a cause for concern because if a theory cannot accu
rately explain past modes of warfare and military revo
lutions, it will surely be unable to account for future
ones.
Only after such analysis is undertaken can Air Force
officers decide what attributes of the Tofflerian framework, and potentially those of the competing frameworks, should be utilized in the creation of postClausewitzian principles of future warfare. 4 This ar
ticle provides an overview and synopsis of each com
peting theory, discusses its impact and shortcomings,
and offers a limited conceptual comparison so that such
informed decisions can begin to be independently made.

*This essay was adapted from a lecture given in the National Security Studies MA program at California State University, San
Bernardino, in the spring of 1995. The contributions of Dr Mark T. Clark, Dr Steven Metz, and Capt Scott Smith, USAF, toward this
essay are acknowledged. All errors are the sole responsibility of the author.
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Fourth-Generation Warfare
(1989)
This theory of warfare was developed by William
S. Lind and four officers from the Army and the US
Marine Corps (USMC). 5 Mr Lind, who has served as a
legislative aide for two senators, is the director of a
conservative think tank and is an authority on maneu
ver warfare. Fourth-generation warfare is primarily a
tactical-level theory, which at times straddles the op
erational level, set in the modern era from about the
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to the present (table 1). It
was published concurrently in the October 1989 issue
of Marine Corps Gazette and Military Review.
This theory is based on a qualitative dialectic stem
ming from the clash of thesis and antithesis and has
not been satisfactorily developed. The introduction of
either new technology or ideas is viewed as the basis
for each succeeding generation of warfare. Military
revolutions in this context are viewed as tactical, pos
sibly operational, innovations in warfare that yield a
decisive advantage to whoever adapts to them first. For
this reason, the current military revolution would be
considered comparable in scope to the one that took
place back in the 1920s and 1930s.
In response to articles by this author and Lt Col
Thomas X. Hammes, Lind and two Marine colleagues
did a reappraisal of this theory in the December 1994
Marine Corps Gazette in which their theoretical per
spectives went basically unchanged. 6 Ideas, not tech
nology, would dominate future warfare. These authors
only took the further step of voicing strong opinions
concerning the potential fragmentation of American
society due to the abandonment of Judeo-Christian cul
ture.
First-Generation Warfare (Technology)
This form of warfare, which developed in about 1648,
was based on the smoothbore musket and tactics cen

tering on the line and column. This generation of warfare was linear and saw the fielding of small profes
sional armies that relied upon rigid drill to maximize
firepower. Interestingly, the French revolutionary
armies with their low training levels and massive manpower levees were included in this generation. These
armies represented the antithesis of the Prussian mili
tary system that had earlier dominated this mode of
warfare.

Before the AirForce openly
embraces the Tofflerian trinity . . .
some well-informed reflection
should first take place.

Second-Generation Warfare (Technology)
The second generation “was a response to the rifled
musket, breechloaders, barbed wire, the machine gun
and indirect fire.” 7 Tactics remained essentially linear
even though fire and movement now became common
as troops dispersed laterally. Massed firepower replaced
massed manpower as indirect fire began to dominate
the battlefield. This generation saw the formal recog
nition and adoption of the operational art devised by
the Prussians.
Third-Generation Warfare (Ideas)
Third-generation warfare was based on ideas rather than
technology. German infiltration tactics devised in
World War I were truly nonlinear, which resulted in
maneuver instead of attrition beingrelied upon to de
stroy an opposing force. These concepts were then ap
plied to the development of the tank and abstracted to
the operational level to form the basis of World War II
blitzkrieg campaigns, which were time-centered rather
than place-centered.

Table 1
Fourth-Generation Warfare
GENERATION

PERIOD

BASIS

First

1648 to present

Technology

Second

1815 to present

Technology

Third

1918 to present

Ideas

Fourth

Emerging

Technology

Fourth

Emerging

Ideas
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Fourth-Generation Warfare (Technology)
Originally proposed in a 1989 article by Lind and oth
ers as one of the two alternative forms of future warfare which might develop, this warfare path was aban
doned by these authors for their idea-based path once
this theory became linked with Dr Martin van Creveld’s
1991 book The Transformation of War. This is unfor
tunate because the potential offered by directed-energy
weaponry, robotics, and media-based operations envi
sioned in the technology warfare path was generally
accurate and has been addressed by both of the other
theories embodied in this essay.
Fourth-Generation Warfare (Ideas)
The emerging fourth generation proposed by Lind and
others is now envisioned to be firmly based on ideas,
specifically non- Western ones. Terrorism, which bypasses traditional military forces and directly strikes at
a nation’s civilian populations, is viewed as a major
component of this mode of warfare. The transnational
or nonnational basis of terrorism makes it extremely
difficult to attack. Ultimately, this form of warfare is
nontrinitarian in character and, for that reason, is postClausewitzian.
Impact. While simultaneously published in both a
Marine Corps and an Army journal, this theory has gone
on to have a greater impact on the Marine Corps than
the other services. This impact has apparently devel
oped because of the Marine Corps’s greater interest in
low-intensity conflict, insurgency, and terrorism upon
which the theory is focused (i.e., the other form of fu
ture war that is developing). Because fourth-genera
tion theory focuses more on the subnational and nonWestern threat to our government than on actually pro
viding any suggestions on what should be done to
counter it, its influence on the Marine Corps has re
mained limited. This theory has had no discernible in
fluence on Air Force, Navy, or Army thinking.

Criticisms. Strong criticism of this theory first ap
peared in an Autumn 1993 Parameters article written
by Maj Kenneth McKenzie, USMC. 8 His well-crafted
and persuasive arguments were directed at the theory’s
flawed methodological and historical underpinnings.
Arguments against its relevancy, however, were less
successful and were met by strong commentary deliv
ered by van Creveld in thefollowing issue. 9
I directed criticisms against the methodological and
historical attributes of this theory in a September 1994
Marine Corps Gazette article. Of specific concern was
that the decoupling of technology and ideas results in
an inaccurate mode of warfare modeling. Still, while it
was suggested that the far larger and more encompass
ing fourth-epoch paradigm better explained the “mili
tary revolution” of our changing modern world, the
theory of Lind and the others was acknowledged as
visionary.
Criticism and support in a number of March 1995
Marine Corps Gazette articles have now focused on
the five-year reappraisal of fourth-generation warfare. 10
That reappraisal has generated a controversial debate
over the basic utility of this theory and where Ameri
can society and the Marine Corps are now heading.

Third-Wave War (1993)
An early published reference to third-wave war can
be dated to a 1991 Los Angeles Times article written
by Alvin and Heidi Toffler. 11 It was not until the publi
cation of their 1993 book, War and Anti-War: Survival
at the Dawn of the 21st Century, that the third-wave
war theory became widely known. 12 Alvin Toffler is
one of the best-known futurists of the twentieth cen
tury. He has served as a Washington correspondent, as
an associate editor of Fortune, as a visiting scholar,
and as a consultant to major corporations. Along with
his wife, Heidi, he has written numerous books and
articles that have popularized their ideas.
War and Anti-War is a continuation of these ear
lier writings and the first attempt by these authors to

Table 2
Tofflerian Waves
WAVE

WHEN DEVELOPED

MODE OF PRODUCTION

First

8,000 B.C.

Agricultural

Second

C. A.D. 1690

Industrial

Third

Current

Knowledge

Source: Robert J. Bunker, "The Tofflerian Paradox," Military Review, May-June 1995, 100.

4 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1996

analyze military matters. War is viewed as an exten
sion of how wealth is made in a society. For this rea
son, it is subordinate to society’s prevailing mode of
production. Much like Marxist materialism without the
accompanying normative baggage, this theory views
humanity as developing three waves (e.g., “super-civi
lizations”) over the course of its history (table 2).
Military revolutions in this theory are viewed as
monumental events that mark the development of new
war forms:
A military revolution, in the fullest sense, occurs
only when a new civilization arises to challenge
the old, when an entire society transforms itself,
forcing its armed services to change at every level
simultaneously—from technology and culture to or
ganization, tactics, training, doctrine, and logistics.
When this happens, the relationship of the military
to the economy and society is transformed, and the
balance of power on earth is shattered. 13

According to this perception, the military revolu
tion we are now witnessing is viewed to be as signifi
cant as that of the French Revolution of the late eigh
teenth century.
First-Wave War (Agricultural)
This war form is based on poorly organized, poorly
equipped, and poorly led armies that engage in sea
sonal fighting. Orders are verbal, pay is irregular and
usually in-kind, and the nature of killing is face-to-face.
First-wave civilizations engaged in this form of war
range from classical Greece and feudal Europe to an
cient China. The Roman legions at their peak were iden
tified as an exception to this concept.
Second-Wave War (Industrial)
The second-wave war form is viewed as representa
tive of industrial civilization. Mass armies using stan
dardized weaponry pro- duced on assembly lines engage in unlimited warfare based on attrition. Officers
are now educated in military academies and orders are
delivered in writing. The machine gun and mechanized
forces have caused the develop- ment of entirely new
tactics. War shifted from a struggle between rulers to
one between peoples embodied by nation-states. This
war form reached its apex of destructive potential with
the development of huge nuclear arsenals stockpiled
by the superpowers.
Third-Wave War (Knowledge)

This emerging war form is based on a new economy
that is information-driven. 14 This is the most extensively
written about war form envisioned by the Tofflers. Pre
cision guided munitions, robots, nonlethal tech- nology,
directed-energy weaponry, and computer viruses are
all viewed as attributes of third-wave war.
Demassification, niche capabilities, and cyberwar are
also discussed, and, as a result, have served to better
inform military officers about advanced technology de
velopments.
Along with the presentation of these intriguing and
exotic technologies is a multitude of questions con
cerning their potential military impact and feasibility.
The implications of such technologies on military eth
ics and societal ideals are, unfortunately, too often ig
nored. Still, the envisioned third-wave war form is postClausewitzian in nature and correct in many of its tech
nical implications.
Impact. Third-wave war theory, with its futuristic
andhigh-technology orientation, has had a significant
impact on the thinking of senior Army officials, spe
cifically Gen Gordon R. Sullivan , the former Army
chief of staff. As a result, some of its ideas are directly
tied to the creation of the “Information Age Army”
envisioned in Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations.
Further, its waves of war have appeared in at least one
official Army publication, and the Tofflers are con
stantly quoted by Army officers in military symposia.
Its institutional influence on the Army may be transi
tory, however, now that General Sullivan has retired.
Because the Marine Corps and Navy are now only beginning to enter the advanced technology aspect of the
RPMA debate, this concept of war has had little mea
surable impact on either service. As mentioned in the
introduction, third-wave war ideas are now finding their
way into the Air Force debate, which is currently cen
tered on the informational aspects of future war.
Criticisms. Criticism of Tofflerian theory is slowly
mounting as its influence on the Army’s senior leadership has now become apparent. While a number of its
forward-looking aspects are viewed as significant con
tributions toward future war-fighting thought, its waves
of war—as Col Richard Swain (USA, Retired), Dr
Steven Metz, and I have shown—have no basis in his
torical reality. 15
Dr Metz, a former professor at the Air War Col
lege, while expressing concerns over the popularity of
third-wave war theory with the military, went on to
quietly downplay the theory’s significance in the Win
ter 1994–95 edition of Parameters. In a May–June 1995
Military Review essay, I launched a far more direct as
sault on its utility by specifically arguing that its envi
sioned war forms are severely flawed and, as a result,
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may be more of a burden than a benefit to the Army’s
RPMA debate.
The Tofflers are correct that a monumental transformation is embracing our society. Because they are
first and foremost futurists, however, they have unfor
tunately had to rationalize this transformation by in
terpreting history so that it would conform to their ab
stract theory of super civilizations.

Fourth-Epoch War (1994)
This theory of war was developed in 1987 by Dr
T. Lindsay Moore and this author in a research semi
nar on classical warfare at the Claremont Graduate
School. We are actively teaching at the graduate level
in the field of national security studies and rely prima
rily on historical analysis in our research endeavors.
The concept of fourth-epoch war is based on a politi
cal science theory that examines the development of
Western civilization over the last2,500 years. Societal
energy foundation change, which directly impacts pol
ity forms and their economic and military systems,
drives the assumptions behind this theory. The theory
itself is concerned with the rise and fall of political

communities, cyclical eras of mercenary domi
nance, and evolving modes of Western warfare.
Because of the immense national security con
cerns this theory raises, it has purposefully been
developed over the last nine years for applied use
by US military and governmental policymakers.
While broad in scope, many components of
fourth-epoch war have many components that are
still unpublished. Documents pertaining to this
theory have existed since 1989, with part of the
theory being first put forth in a September 1994
Marine Corps Gazette article. 16 To date, only the
land warfare attributes of this still-evolving theory
have been published.
This theory divides Western civilization into
four energy-based epochs (table 3). Each epoch
is composed of one or more energy sequences,
each of which expresses its own unique modes of
warfare based on the experimental and institution
alized exploitation of a given form of energy (e.g.,
human, animal, machine, engine, postengine).
Military systems are viewed as a synthesis of tech-

Table 3
Energy and War in Western Civilization
EPOCH

ENERGY

WARFARE

Classical

Experimental Human

Hellenic

Classical

Institutionalized Human

Roman

Medieval

External Threat

Raider

Medieval

Experimental Animal

Vassal

Medieval

Institutionalized Animal

Feudal

Modern

Experimental Machine

Dynastic

Modern

Institutionalized Machine

Absolutist

Modern

Experimental Engine

Corporate

Modern

Institutionalized Engine

Modern

Post-Modern

External Threat

Non-Western*

Post-Modern

Experimental Post-Engine

Advanced Techology

*Formerly Terrorist/Low-Intensity Conflict
Source: Robert J. Bunker, "The Transition to Fourth Epoch War," Marine Corps Gazette, September 1994, 22.
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nology and ideas that qualitatively differ between
modes of warfare.
Military revolutions in this context are viewed as
the attainment of a new energy threshold by Western
civilization. Intraepochal military revolutions (i.e.,
within an energy paradigm) are viewed as significantly
less disruptive phenomena, while interepochal military
revolutions (i.e., between energy paradigms) are viewed
as massive civilization-changing events.

If a theory cannot accurately
explain past modes of warfare
and military revolutions, it
will surely be unable to
account for future ones.
Based on the historical trends isolated in this theory,
the current RPMA represents an interepochal military
revolution that will place the survival of the current
dominant polity form, the nation-state, in considerable
doubt and, as a result, will ultimately give rise to a
postmodern form of political community. This mili
tary revolution, now only in its early stages, is viewed
as being equal in magnitude to that of the European
Renaissance.
First-Epoch War (Human Energy)
First-epoch war existed within the classical world and
was based on the exploitation of human forms of en
ergy. The two modes of warfare that developed were
Hellenic warfare, which was based on the phalanx, and
Roman warfare, which was based on the legion. The
economy during this entire era was based on slave-hold
ing, thecity-state was the basis of the political commu
nity, and the dominant ideological paradigm was
founded on virtue (i.e., the relationships and differences
between masters and slaves).
Second-Epoch War (Animal Energy)
War in the second epoch took place within the Medi
eval world. This epoch contains three modes of warfare and is based on the exploitation of animal forms
of energy. The raiders on the borders of Europe intro
duced mass cavalry-based warfare, which resulted in
the fall of Rome and a period of barbarism in the West.
The successor states to the Western half of this great
empire responded by means of the development of in
digenously based cavalry forces. Under the later feu
dal monarchies, these forces evolved into knights. The
economy during this civilization epoch was based on
fief-holding, the feudal state became the dominant pol

ity form, and ideology rested on Divine Providence
under the vestiges of the Church.
Third-Epoch War (Mechanical Energy)
The modern, or third, epoch of war exists in a mechani
cal-based energy paradigm. This paradigm contains two
energy sequences of machine- and engine-based en
ergy, respectively. The first energy sequence, based on
machine energy, saw the rise of mercenary armies dur
ing the dynastic era and their eventual institutionaliza
tion during the Age of Absolutism. Mercantilism rep
resented the dominant mode of production, while dy
nastic states represented the major political form. The
second energy sequence, based on engine energy, wit
nessed the rise of corporate warfare ushered in by
Napoleonic France in its early stage and the develop
ment of the German concept of blitzkrieg warfare in
its later and more modern institutionalized stage. Capi
talism replaced mercantilism as the basis of the
economy, and the nation-state replaced the dynastic
state as the focal point of political organization.
Fourth-Epoch War (Postmechanical Energy)
Fourth-epoch war represents the emerging warfare of
the postmodern world. Two initial modes of warfare,
based on postmechanical energy sources, are now de
veloping. These are non-Western and advanced tech
nology warfare, respectively. Non-Western warfare is
based on the blending of terrorism and low-intensity
conflict (LIC) as a challenge to the West’s dominance
in modern warfare. This is a mode of warfare that is
equivalent in many respects to idea-based,fourth- gen
eration warfare. 17 Further, the increasing urbanization
of the developing nations of the world is envisioned as
negating much of the current dominance in modern war
held by the West in its overseas operations. This domi
nance negation results because of the degradation of
qualitative weapon superiority in the restrictive terrain
of sprawling urban slums and the problem of distin
guishing individual combatants from masses of inno
cent civilians.
Advanced technology warfare represents the rise
of new military technologies such as precision guided
weapons, information warfare, nonlethal weaponry,
robotic war-fighting units, and directed-energy weap
onry. Both Lind and the Tofflers recognize this rise of
new technologies; however, only the Tofflers fully incorporate it into their projection of future war. While
the Tofflers view the US Army in the Gulf War as hav
ing adapted Tofflerian doctrine to such advanced tech
nology, I argue that it has been used in no more than a
“strap-on” role and has not significantly altered
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AirLand Battle doctrine based on modern war-fight
ing principles.
Impact. The impact of fourth-epoch war theory has
been limited, although it has contributed toward the
redirection of the theoretical debate in the Marine Corps
away from maneuver warfare and toward both the ad
vanced technology and non-Western warfare aspects
of the RPMA. 18 Directed toward the Army, this theory
is now being used to help challenge the basic premises
behind the operations-other-than-war (OOTW) con
cept, politico-military force implications of nonlethal
technology, and fundamental concepts of battlespace. 19
No impact on the Air Force or the Navy has been noted
other than an initial query from Naval Doctrine Com
mand concerning the naval applications of this theory.
Criticisms. No in-depth criticisms have had time
to develop in reaction to this theory. Past commentary
has mentioned its failure to address developments in
air warfare, the lack of emphasis on advanced infor
mation technology, the nonreflection of the reality of
battle, and the overreliance on a single-factor (i.e., en
ergy) explanation of historical change. As more com
ponents of this theory are published, stronger criticisms
such as those voiced by Lt Gen Victor H. Krulak
(USMC, Retired) will undoubtedly be directed towards
the theory. 20

. . . Third-wave war theory,
however, may be critically
flawed.
Conclusion
As I have stated, the Tofflers have promoted the
most popularized theory of future war. Components of
their third-wave war theory, however, may be critically
flawed. For that reason, it should be compared to the
other two theories highlighted in thisessay before it is
acknowledged as the authoritative work on this sub
ject. To aid in this comparison, the modes of warfare
qualitatively modeled in each framework have been
placed side-by-side for analysis (table 4).
The subepochs contained within fourth-epoch war
provide the most detailed modal delineations of Western history for the three theories presented in this es
say. The reason for this is that this theory was first and
foremost a model of historical trends and only in the
last few years has it begun to be used to forecast future
modes of warfare. Against the modes of warfare expressed in fourth-epoch theory, the waves of war envi
sioned by the Tofflers appear as what they are—super
ficial “MTV clips.” 21
The generations of modern war developed by Lind
and his colleagues, on the other hand, hold up quite

well to the subepochs of this theory. The reason for
this is that their generations approximate actual modes
of warfare that have existed over the last few centuries.22 Given the governmental and military backgrounds of the developers of fourth-generation warfare theory, their accuracy is not at all surprising.
A further comparison of these theories can be made
regarding their perception of the current RPMA now
taking place (table 5). The fourth generationalists origi
nally viewed the current military revolution on a scale
to that which took place back in the 1920s and 1930s
with the development of armor, carrier aviation, and
concepts of amphibious and strategic bombing operations.23 Their theory cannot account for greater magni
tudes of change because of its limited level of analy
sis. By linking it to the work of Dr Martin van Creveld,
however, its authors now promote the perception that
war will be waged outside of the nation-state framework and will possess nontrinitarian characteristics.
The Tofflers suggest that the current military revo
lution is equivalent in magnitude to that of the French
Revolution. Besides change at the tactical and opera
tional level, significant human civilization change is
foreseen. Knowledge will become the new form of
wealth, and, as a result, new economic, political, so
cial, and military structures will develop. Because their
abstract concepts have no basis in Western history,
however, their “civilization waves” are flawed and
therefore improperly articulate the historical process
that is now taking place. 24
Fourth-epoch war theory recognizes that both tac
tical and operational change along with economic, po
litical, social, and military structure change will take
place. This theory, however, views the current mili
tary revolution as equivalent to that of the European
Renaissance. Because of this perception, a shift in the
energy foundation of Western civilization is foreseen
along with anaccompanying alteration in the nature of
politico-military force and the deinstitutionalization of
political violence (i.e., the loss of the nation-state’s
monopoly on war). As a result, a corresponding rise in
military entrepreneurs (e.g., terrorists, guerrilla groups,
local warlords, private armies, drug cartels, and multinational corporations) engaged in warfare will take
place, bringing into question the political legitimacy,
and hence survival, of the nation-state during the next
century. 25
Despite any flaws highlighted in these modal warfare and military revolution perceptual comparisons,
the three dominant theories of future war highlighted
in this article can each individually still provide a con
tribution to the emerging RPMA debate within the Air
Force—although the contribution provided by the
Tofflers will likely be far smaller than first envisioned.
For these contributions to be fully understood, how-
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Table 4
Subepochs, Waves, and Generations
SUBEPOCH (ENERGY
SEQUENCE)

WAVES (MODE
OF PRODUCTION)

GENERATION
(TACTICAL BASIS)

Hellenic
(Experimental Human)

First (Agricultural)

N/A

Roman
(Institutionalized Human)

Unexplained

N/A

Raider (External Threat)

First (Agricultural)

N/A

Vassal (Experimental Animal)

First (Agricultural)

N/A

Feudal (Institutionalized Animal)

First (Agricultural)

N/A

Dynastic (Experimental Machine)

Unexplained

N/A

Absolutist (Institutionaized Machine)

Unexplained

First (Technology)

Corporate (Experimental Engine)

Second (Industrial)

Second (Technology)

Modern (Institutionalized Engine)

Unexplained

Third (Ideas)

Non-Western* (External Threat)

Unexplained

Fourth (Ideas)

Advanced Technology
(Experimental Post-Engine)

Third (Knowledge)

Fourth (Technology)

*Formerly Terrorist/Low-Intensity Conflict

Table 5
RPMA Equivalence
FOURTH GENERATION

THIRD WAVE

FOURTH EPOCH

Change Equivalent to
1920s and 1930s

Change Equivalent to French
Revolution

Change Equivalent to
European Renaissance

Tactical/Operational
Change

Tactical/Operational Change

Tactical/Operational
Change

N/A

Economic, Political, Social,
Military Change

Economic, Political,
Social, Military Change

N/A

N/A

Energy Foundation
Change
AlteredNature of
Politico-Military Force
Deinstitutionalization
of Political Violence
Rise of Military
Entrepreneurs
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ever, the primary documents relating to each theory
should be explored so that its potential benefit toward
the development of post-Clausewitzian Air Force op
erational concepts and principles can be assessed.
Further, it is imperative that there be serious re
flection and debate on the historical magnitude of the
current military revolution now taking place. Failure
to recognize the true magnitude of the change taking
place will result in inaccurate assumptions being made
when formulating strategic and operational concepts.
As a prime case in point, we must now ask ourselves if
war is still “a struggle between nation-states or their
coalitions over the preservation and extension of na
tional sovereignty” or if it is now rapidly shifting to “a
struggle between competing forms of social and po
litical organization over which the eventual successor
to the nation-state will be built.”
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